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1Abstract
The race to sequence the human genome between the federal government’s Human Genome Project and
the private ﬁrm Celera Genomics is one of the most fascinating tales in the history of science. This paper
explores the role that the prospect of obtaining patents on these DNA sequences played in stimulating that
race. It then examines diﬀerent policy rationales for and against DNA sequence patents. In doing so, two
competing goals rise to the surface – incentivizing the creation of downstream products versus maintaining
an open and cordial research environment. Finally, the paper explores how the current law deals with these
objectives and suggests a number of possible changes to strike a better balance.
2On March 14, 2000, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair issued the following statement
about attaching property rights to the “fruits” of the Human Genome Project:
To realize the full promise of this research, raw fundamental data on the human genome,
including the human DNA sequence and its variations, should be made freely available to
scientists everywhere. Unencumbered access to this information will promote discoveries
that will reduce the burden of disease, improve health around the world, and enhance the
quality of life for all humankind. Intellectual property protection for gene-based inventions
will also play an important role in stimulating the development of important new health care
products. We applaud the decision by scientists working on the Human Genome Project
to release raw fundamental information about the human DNA sequence and its variants
rapidly into the public domain, and we commend other scientists around the world to adopt
this policy.1
Although the statement deliberately highlighted the important role that patents would continue to play
in bringing new products to market, its emphasis on making human DNA sequences “freely available to
scientists everywhere” was mistaken as a call for the elimination of all gene patents. This misinterpretation
sent the biotech sector plummeting, taking the rest of the NASDAQ with it. One company in particular,
Celera Genomics, lost over $2 billion in market value; and, as we will see much later in this paper, many feel
that this was more political gamesmanship than accident.2
Celera Genomics was founded by a scientist who has been either loved or hated, but never ignored. His
name is Craig J. Venter, and he decided that Celera would sequence the human genome on its own. The
race that developed between Venter’s private company and the publicly-funded Human Genome Project,
led by the equally (if not more) distinguished Francis Collins, is one of the most fascinating and signiﬁcant
stories in the history of science. It has its ﬁngers right on the pulse of one of the most pressing ethical,
political, economic, and legal issues of our day – the patenting of human DNA. Although DNA patenting is
a fairly recent phenomenon, it has generated a signiﬁcant amount of controversy. From religious leaders to
2James Shreeve, The Genome War: How Craig Venter Tried to Capture the Code of Life and Save the World 322 (2004).
3biotechnological industrialists, there are a wide range of opinions as to whether such patents are appropriate.
Legally, DNA patents have been recognized, and this is in keeping with the general push towards the commer-
cialization of basic research science that began with the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.3Briefly,theBayh−DoleAct
was an eﬀort to promote the commercial development of new technologies in the private sector by permitting
the patenting of inventions made with the use of federal funds. Although both patent applications and pri-
vate investment in biotechnology have increased since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, some commentators
have suggested that “a proliferation of intellectual property rights upstream may be stiﬂing life-saving inno-
vations further downstream in the course of research and product development.”4 Furthermore, scientists
(unaccustomed to the ways of the marketplace) have complained that basic science is losing its open, cordial,
and cooperative atmosphere. Taken to the extreme, one might ask if society is better served by scientists
concerned with peer-reviewed publications or stock options. Although I do not pretend to know the answer,
it occurred to me that the race to capture the human genome involved two such diﬀerent groups of scientists.
This paper will explore that race and the role that the patent law played in each group’s rationale for running
it. Speciﬁcally, §1 will discuss the events of “the race” that developed between the two diﬀerent initiatives.
§2 will provide background as to the general rationale for intellectual property protection and its role in the
ﬁeld of biotechnology. §3 will then examine diﬀerent policy arguments for and against the patenting of DNA
sequences. Finally, §4 will track the adjustments in the doctrines of patentability and infringement over time
as a way of examining which policy objectives have dominated. Finally, two possible changes in the law will
335 U.S.C. §§ 200 et seq., P.L. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980).
4Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
Science 698-701 (1998).
4be suggested as a way to strike a better balance between the interests of the two opposing groups.
§1 – The Race for the Human Genome
A. The Public Initiative – The Human Genome Project
Although the National Institutes of Health (NIH) would eventually come to dominate the project, the idea to
sequence the entire human genome was ﬁrst put forward by the Department of Energy (DOE) at a meeting
of the nation’s top geneticists at Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory in 1986. The idea did not ﬁnd a warm
reception. Since the sequencing methods in 1986 were so slow, the scientists did not think the time was ripe
to abandon their current strategy of searching for individual genes.
However, everything changed when James Watson committed to the project in 1988.5WatsonagreedtobedirectoroftheHumanGenomeProject(HGP)ontheconditionthatitwastheNIH,andnottheDOE,thatwouldbedistributingthefunds.TheHGPofficiallybeganinOctober1990,andtheNIHcreatedtheNationalHumanGenomeResearchInstitute(NHGRI)toserveasitsarmoftheproject.Realizingthatthehumangenomesequencehadgreatethicalimplications,Watsondecidedthat3%ofallHGPfundswouldbeusedtofinanceanEthical,LegalandSocialImplicationsprogram.6
Instead of sequencing immediately, the HGP used the ﬁrst ﬁve years to map the genome, i.e. to dis-
cover particular genetic landmarks and note their location relative to each other. This “map ﬁrst, se-
quence later” strategy also provided makers of sequencing technology with time to advance the state of the
5Shreeve, supra, at 40-42.
6To learn more about the NHGRI generally, or its Ethical, Legal and Social Implications program speciﬁcally, see
www.genome.gov.
5art.7However,by1996,FrancisCollins,whohadreplacedWatsonasdirectoroftheNHGRI,couldnotaffordtowaitanylongerforafasterbreedofsequencers.CollinsawardedgrantstosixAmericangenomecenterstobeginsequencingofhumanDNA.ThegenomecentersweretheWhiteheadInstitute(atM.I.T.),WashingtonUniversity,BaylorCollegeofMedicine,theUniversityofWashington,StanfordUniversity,andTheInstituteforGenomicResearch(TIGR).8TIGRwasrunbyamannamedCraigV enter−−towhomwewillreturnshortly.
In addition to the American genome centers, John Sulston’s lab at the Sanger Centre (Cambridge, England)
received a large grant from the Wellcome Trust and was slated to sequence a sixth of the human genome.
The Wellcome Trust is a charity created by Sir Henry Wellcome, the founder of a successful pharmaceutical
company, the Wellcome Foundation (today GlaxoSmithKline). On Sir Henry’s death, all of his shares were
placed in the trust, and the trustees were directed to use the income to beneﬁt human health. The Wellcome
Trust became the wealthiest medical research charity in the world following the company’s introduction of
AZT in 1992.9
The Wellcome Trust played a critical role in establishing the HGP’s political credo of free, public, and
immediate access to its genomic sequence. By 1995, many academics working on the HGP were anxious
to start the sequencing phase of the project. As we’ll see below, their anxiety was due to the fact that a
number of private genomic ventures had launched a “gold rush” on the human genome. These companies
were ﬁling patent applications by the thousands for gene fragments called expressed sequence tags (ESTs).
Ironically, it was the NIH (with Craig Venter listed as the inventor) that ﬁrst ﬁled an application for such an
invention. Although the NIH eventually abandoned its controversial application, Pandora’s Box had already
been opened. Private companies such as Incyte Genomics picked up the idea of patenting ESTs and ran
with it all the way to the bank.
7Shreeve, supra, at 44.
8Id. at 45.
9John Sulston and Georgina Ferry, The Common Thread, 91 (2002).
6Desiring a consensus among the international sequencing community with regard to the issue of data release,
the Wellcome Trust sponsored a meeting in Bermuda during February 1996.10MostscientistsintheacademiccommunitysharedtheopinionofJohnSulston,theleaderofthesequencinggroupattheSangerCentre.Sulstonfeltthatallsequencesshouldbeimmediatelydepositedintothepublicdatabases.Helaterremarked:
By doing this, we would not only help science to progress; we would make the sequences in
themselves unpatentable. Patenting opportunities would be open only to those who went
on to do the real work of discovering what the sequences did and developing commercial
products based on that understanding...But all this, while truly a calculation that we made,
makes the policy sound too purely pragmatic, or at least too short-term. The fact is that
we’d come to realize that the genomic sequence we were producing and dealing with is more
than a commodity. It is the essence of biological heritage, the instruction book for living
things...The only reasonable way of dealing with the human genome sequence is to say that
it belongs to us all – it is the common heritage of humankind.11
Although Sulston’s rallying cry was contagious, there was nevertheless a political obstacle for the American
genome centers – the Bayh-Dole Act.
Since the American genome centers were receiving federal funds from NIH and DOE, they were technically
required to secure patent rights on all commercially valuable discoveries before putting them into the public
domain. However, Francis Collins and the other American leaders of the HGP agreed that the underlying
human DNA sequence was too important to be controlled by one entity.
The scientists hammered out what has since become known as the “Bermuda Accord.” They agreed that all
DNA sequences longer than 2000 base pairs must be placed in GenBank (the public database administered
by the NIH) within 24 hours of their discovery. The eﬀect of the Bermuda Accord was that it would be
impossible to patent these raw DNA sequences. Although technically in breach of the Bayh-Dole Act, Collins
made it clear that no funding would be distributed to any lab that did not speciﬁcally state its intention to
abide by the Bermuda Accord.12
10Id. at 143.
12Shreeve, supra, at 46.
7The HGP community viewed the Bermuda meetings as a great success. The scientists had been able to
compare notes on various sequencing issues and formulate a plan of attack for dividing and conquering the
human genome sequence. They reaﬃrmed their intention to produce a sequence of the highest possible
quality. Finally, the leaders of the HGP had struck a blow to private interests by adopting a data release
policy of immediate public disclosure.
During the Bermuda meetings, one person who voiced opposition to Sulston’s data release policy was Craig
Venter, director of The Institute for Genomic Research (TIGR). Although distrusted by many academics due
to his relationships with a private company, Venter and his lab had been selected as one of the six American
genome centers to begin actual sequencing of human DNA in 1996. However, a mere two years later, Venter
would become the HGP’s ultimate pariah.
B. Craig Venter – Darth Vader of Genomics
Craig Venter’s part in this story begins with his work at the National Institute of Neurological Disorders
and Stroke, a part of the NIH. Although he was supposed to be studying brain cell-surface receptors, Ven-
ter recognized that genomics was the wave of the future. In 1987, he contacted Michael Hunkapiller of Applied
Biosystems, a division of Perkin Elmer.13HunkapillerhaddesignedanewautomatedDNAsequencer,andV entersignedontohavehislabserveasatestsite.V enterbecamequiteproficientwiththesequencers.In1989,heutilizedthemtodevelopafasterwaytofindgenes.
Venter’s method involved the sequencing of complementary DNA (cDNA). cDNA is obtained by apply-
13Id. at 78.
8ing a special enzyme (called reverse transcriptase) to messenger RNA (mRNA) that has been extracted
from tissue. Without getting into too much biology, obtaining this cDNA is the equivalent of isolating
just the protein-coding regions of genes (the part of our DNA that is most likely to be useful for un-
derstanding diseases). Venter’s idea was to use the new machines to sequence just enough of the cDNA
(approximately 150-400 bases) to identify the gene as unique from the others expressed in the same tis-
sue.14V entercalledtheseshortstretchesofgenesequence“expressedsequencetags
00(ESTs).Besidesidentifyingtheexistenceofthenewgene,V enterrealizedthattheESTscouldlaterbeusedasprobestolocatethefullgene
0spositiononthechromosomes.
Venter began by sequencing cDNA from brain tissue and started to churn out tons of new ESTs. By
the summer of 1990, Venter’s lab had found 2000 ESTs, “essentially doubling the number of known human
genes.”15V enterwassoexcitedthathewrotetoJamesWatsoninhopesofreceivingHGPfundingtolocatemoregenes.WhenWatsondecidednottoabandonthe“mapfirst,sequencelater
00strategy,V enterdecidedtotakehisfightpublic.Ina1991
Science article, he described how his cDNA method was “a bargain in comparison to the genome project.”16WhilethistacticsurelydidnotservetoincreaseV ender
0spopularitywithintheHGPcommunity,hisnextmovewasseenasevenmoreoutrageous.
On June 20, 1991, Venter, on behalf of the NIH, ﬁled a patent application which claimed over 300 human DNA
sequences in the form of ESTs.17Tosaythattheapplicationwascontroversialwouldbeanunderstatement.AlthoughtheclaimsappearedtobelimitedtotheESTsthemselves,commentatorsnotedthatsuchpatents,ifissued,wouldresultincontrolovertheentiregenes.V enter
0sapplicationdidnotlinktheclaimedESTstoanyspecificfunctionordisease.Inotherwords,heknewneitherthelocationsofhisgenesnorwhatproteinstheycoded.Instead,theapplicationsimplyclaimedthattheESTshadutilityintheirabilitytoserveasprobes.18
At a Senate meeting the following month, James Watson let Venter and the NIH know what he thought of
their application. After Venter testiﬁed that the NIH planned to ﬁle patent applications for 1000 ESTs per
month, Watson dismissed the patent application as “sheer lunacy” and remarked that Venter’s automated se-
14Sulston, supra, at 105.
15Shreeve, supra, at 82.
16Id. at 83.
17Who Owns Life? 76 (David Magnus et al. eds., Prometheus Books 2002).
18Id.
9quencing machines “could be run by monkeys.”19Hecontinued:“Whatisimportantisinterpretingthesequence...Iftheserandombitsofsequencescanbepatented,Iamhorrified.
0020Throughthewordsofitsleader,itisclearthattheHGPcommunitydidnotcondonethis“goldrush
00mentality.
On the ﬂip side, there was a legitimate argument for the actions of the NIH and Venter. In fact, although Ven-
ter was viliﬁed for its ﬁling, he was initially opposed to the patent application. Reid Adler, the head of NIH’s
Technology Transfer Oﬃce, approached Venter and told him that the NIH was obligated under the Bayh-Dole
Act to try to patent the ESTs.21Furthermore,AdlerexplainedthatbiotechfirmshadbeguntoexpressconcernaboutV enter
0ssequencesbeingdepositedintothepublicdomain.TheyworriedthatthedisclosureoftheESTsequenceswoulddestroyanylaterchancetopatenttheentiregenesincethecourtscouldrulethatthelatersequencefailedthenoveltytest
(something that we’ll return to in §4). According to this rationale, it would be better for American business
if the NIH ﬁrst patented the ESTs and then licensed the rights to the sequences. Adler also noted that the
NIH could provide free licenses to academics.22V enterwaseventuallyconvincedandfiledtheapplication.
As demonstrated above, James Watson could not live under the same roof with anybody who supported the
patenting of ESTs. Because Bernadine Healy, then director of the NIH, refused to back down from her support
of the Venter application, Watson resigned as head of the NHGRI in April 1992.23TheNIHeventuallyabandoneditspatentapplicationontheESTsinearly1994.HaroldV armus,newdirectoroftheNIHwiththeClintonAdministration,commentedthatpatentsonESTsare“notinthebestinterestsofthepublicorscience.
0024However,asweshallseebelow,thegoldrushwasalreadywellunderwayintheprivatesectorby1994.
While Watson and the HGP were not interested in embracing his cDNA method for discovering new genes,
Venter soon realized that many private ventures were. In fact, a venture capitalist named Wallace Steinberg
19Shreeve, supra, at 85.
20Who Owns Life?, supra, at 79.
21Shreeve, supra, at 84.
22Id.
23Who Owns Life?, supra, at 81.
24Id. at 87.
10soon made him an oﬀer he couldn’t refuse.25V enterwouldbeallowedtorunhisownnonprofitinstituteandwouldreceive$70million,overthecourseofsevenyears,tobeusedasV enterdesired.Inexchange,V enter
0sinstitutewouldsurrenderallcommercialrightsarisingoutofitsdiscoveriestoHumanGenomeSciencesInc.(HGS),afor−profitcompanythathadalsorecentlybeencreatedbySteinberg.V enterwouldalsoreceive10%ofthesharesofHGStoboot.InJuly1992,V enterannouncedhisdeparturefromNIHandnamedthenewnonprofitTheInstituteforGenomicResearch(TIGR).26MeanwhileSteinberghadbroughtinWilliamHaseltine,anAIDSresearcheratHarvardwithareputationfor“aggressivenessinscienceandbusiness,
00toserveasCEOofHGS.27
Venter brought the majority of his lab with him to TIGR. There they continued to sequence human cD-
NAs and discover new ESTs. According to the agreement, Venter’s fresh sequences were ﬁrst deposited
into a database. HGS would then have six months to study them and decide whether to ﬁle any patents
(HGS had the option of extending the period another twelve months for any sequence it found valu-
able).28Afterthattime,V enterwasfreetopublishhisdiscoveriesintheacademicjournals,andresearcherswerefreetousethesequencesprovidedthattheyagreedtogiveHGS“reachthrough
00rightstoanyfurthercommercialdevelopments.29
When HGS sold an exclusive license to its “early access” to SmithKline Beecham for $125 million, Venter
instantly made millions. As happy as this surely made him, Venter was soon publicly lamenting about the
fact that Haseltine was routinely applying the twelve-month extension to new sequences. As a consequence,
very little sequence data from TIGR was entering the public domain.
The HGP community wasn’t buying Venter’s sob story. One key player in the HGP remarked: “When
he went oﬀ with Bill Haseltine, Craig was seen as evil. The world looked on TIGR as an absolute den of
corruption.”30PerhapsJohnSulstonsaiditbest:
25Shreeve, supra, at 86.
26Who Owns Life, supra, at 82.
27Shreeve, supra, at 87.
28Id. at 86.
29Sulston, supra, at 108.
30Shreeve, supra, at 88.
11I saw [Venter’s] deal with Human Genome Sciences as compromising Craig’s academic in-
tegrity. I felt he wanted to have it both ways: to achieve recognition and acclaim from his
peers for his scientiﬁc work, but also to accommodate the needs of his business partners for
secrecy, and to enjoy the resulting proﬁts.31
Sulston’s description causes me to think of Venter as the “Darth Vader of genomics.” Like Vader, there
seems to be some good in him. For example, frustrated with Haseltine, Venter turned his attention to the
sequencing of entire microbial genomes. This move away from the lucrative human ESTs came at the peak
time of the private-sector gold rush and infuriated Haseltine.32
The relationship between Venter and Haseltine continued to deteriorate over the next couple of years until
the partnership between TIGR and HGS was ﬁnally dissolved in 1997.33 During that time, Venter’s repeated
release of microbial DNA sequences into the public domain against Haseltine’s wishes partially restored his
tarnished reputation in the academic community. As noted above, TIGR was even selected as one of the
six genomic centers to receive funds for human sequencing. Yet, Venter would soon enter into another
Faustian-like bargain.
What makes scientists like Craig Venter act so diﬀerently than those like James Watson? Perhaps it’s just a
diﬀerence in attitude toward the commercialization of science. James Watson and many of the other leaders
of the HGP fall into the older camp of “science purists.” They believe in the free and open exchange of
scientiﬁc knowledge. In their minds, only applications of science should be commercialized. On the other
hand, Craig Venter is a clear product of the “Bayh-Dole generation” (if not the Bayh-Dole Act incarnate).
This new breed of “commercial scientists” subscribes to the belief that science moves forward most eﬃciently
when tied to the capital markets.
32Shreeve, supra, at 107.
33Id. at 112.
12C. The Indirect Threat to the HGP
Even well-regarded scientists within the HGP community were seduced by the Sirens’ song of the venture
capitalists in the early 1990s. For example, Eric Lander, the director of the Whitehead Institute at M.I.T., co-
founded Millenium Pharmaceuticals in Cambridge, MA.34Conflictofinterestproblemsaside,thesescientistsdidnotposemuchofathreattotheHGPsincethemajorityofthemfeltthatthehumangenomesequenceitselfshouldnotbetakenoutofthepublicdomain.Aswesawabove,thisconsensuswouldeventuallybesetinstoneintheformofthe1996BermudaAccord.
By the mid-1990s, the real threat to the HGP’s credo of “free access for all” was the explosion of private
gene-hunting ﬁrms that aimed to lock-up the sequence for themselves. Regardless of Venter’s intentions, his
NIH patent application and subsequent relationship with HGS launched a gold rush on the human genome.
For example, Incyte Genomics (originally Incyte Pharmaceuticals) was formed in 1991 to ﬁnd genes using
Venter’s cDNA method. When HGS signed its exclusive agreement with SmithKline Beecham, the other
pharmaceutical houses ﬂocked to Incyte’s database to get their share of ESTs. Incyte’s revenues soared as
it collected nonexclusive licensing fees from these companies.35
Besides collecting database access fees, these gene-hunting companies were also ﬁling patent applications. By
the time the NIH abandoned its infamous EST patent application in 1994, HGS had ﬁled patent applications
for nearly 10,000 ESTs. Incyte had ﬁled applications for over 40,000 ESTs and planned to ﬁle for over 100,000
34Sulston, supra, at 110.
35Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress 121 (2000).
13ESTs each year going forward.36AlthoughtheHGPhadbegunin1990,itsdecisionto“mapfirst,sequencelater
00meantthatby1994only1%ofthegenomehadbeensequencedandplacedintothepublicdomain.37SincetheHGPplandidnotcallforthecompletionofthehumansequenceuntil2005,somethingneededtobedonetoaddressthethreatposedbythepatentapplicationsoftheseprivatefirms.
Ironically, the HGP’s “white knight” took the form of the pharmaceutical company Merck.38LiketheHGP,pharmaceuticalgiantsalsoperceivedtheseupstartbiotechcompaniesthatwerelockinguprightstothegenomeasathreat.MerckfundeditsownaggressiveprogramtodiscoverESTsatWashingtonUniversity(oneoftheHGP
0sgenomecenters).UnliketheTIGRorIncytedatabases,Merck
0ssequenceswerefreelyavailabletoallwithnostringsattached.39AlthoughMerckundoubtedlyhaditsowninterestsinmind,itsdatareleasepolicyassistedtheHGPbyplacingalargenumberofESTsintothepublicdomain.
The HGP leaders applauded Merck’s eﬀorts. However, John Sulston of the Sanger Centre and Bob Wa-
terston of Washington University wanted to go even further. They were worried that with so many ESTs
being sequenced on the private side, Congress would begin to question the purpose of the public pro-
gram.40SulstonandWaterstonunderstoodthegreatvalueinhavingnotonlythegenesthemselves,butalsothe“junkDNA
00regionsthatcontainedthevaluableregulatorysequences.Theypresentedanaggressiveplantoimmediatelybeginthesequencingoftheentiregenome.Thecatchwasthatthesequencingwouldoccuratonlythreegenomecenters.Theplancalledforalargeincreaseinfundingandwouldproducea“workingdraft
00ofthegenomeby2002.41
The increased funding was not much of a stumbling block since Francis Collins knew he would have to ask
Congress for more funds regardless of when the sequence phase actually began. However, the suggestion of
generating a working draft, which in eﬀect meant a reduction in accuracy, was met with great resistance.
From the beginning, the HGP leaders had promised a sequence that would stand the test of time. They
were not about to retract that promise. Finally, the proposal to limit the sequencing to three genomic
centers was wildly unpopular. The twenty or so labs that had spent the last ﬁve years mapping the genome
understandably felt entitled to also sequence their respective segments.42
36Who Owns Life?, supra, at 88.
37Id. at 118.
38Id.
39Shreeve, supra, at 88.
40Sulston, supra, at 119.
41Id. at 128.
42Id. at 127.
14In the end, Francis Collins decided to stay the course and rejected the Sulston/Waterston proposal. Other
leaders, such as Eric Lander of the Whitehead Institute, convinced Collins that a new breed of sequencers
that would allow the HGP to maintain its high accuracy standard was just around the corner. However, the
Sulston and Waterston labs had demonstrated that they were eager for battle and were rewarded accordingly.
Sulston actually received his requested increase in funding from the Wellcome Trust, and Waterston’s lab at
Washington University received the largest grant when Collins ﬁnally decided in 1996 that the sequencing
phase could wait no longer. In hindsight, the HGP probably should have adopted the Sulston/Waterston
platform since, as we shall see below, it was later forced to switch to a “working-draft” strategy upon the
arrival of Venter’s private-sector competitor for the human genome sequence.43
D. The Direct Assault – Celera Genomics
As with the 1991 NIH patent application, the idea to privately sequence the human genome did not originate
with Craig Venter. It was born at a Perkin Elmer (PE) business meeting. PE’s Applied Biosystems, the
division lead by Michael Hunkapiller, had a virtual monopoly on the automated sequencer market. Yet, PE’s
CEO, Tony White, was not content to simply sell the pickaxes to the gold-mining companies like Incyte.
White wanted a piece of the action, and he had a secret weapon. 44
43Id. at 138.
44Shreeve, supra, at 60-61.
15Hunkapiller’s development team was close to ﬁnishing a new brand of sequencer that would render the
current generation archaic. When a scientist at the PE business meeting joked that a couple hundred of
Hunkapiller’s new machines could sequence the human genome in three years, White instantly saw his open-
ing.45WhereastheothergenomiccompaniesweresellingmereaccesstoESTs,hisnewcompanywouldprovideaccesstothewholegenome−−regulatoryregionsandall.Pharmaceuticalcompaniesandacademicswouldflocktosuchadatabase.WhiteandHunkapillerknewtherightmantoleadsuchanambitiousnewventure.Hisnamewas
Craig Venter.
Once Venter fully appreciated the speed of Hunkapiller’s new sequencers, he became very excited about the
opportunity. Yet, having so recently freed himself from the clutches of Bill Haseltine and HGS, Venter was re-
luctant. He agreed to head up the company on the understanding that the raw sequence would be freely avail-
able to the public. White assured him that “the company would seek patents on only a few hundred medically
important genes.”46TheydecidedtonamethecompanyCeleraGenomicsCorporation,basedupontheLatinwordforspeed.PEwouldfinanceCeleratothetuneof$300million.47
Venter immediately began a series of shrewd tactical maneuvers. Even before informing Francis Collins and
his other HGP collaborators, Venter contacted a reporter from the New York Times to lay out his vision for
the company and suggested, in not so many words, that the public HGP should shift its focus in order to avoid
redundancy.48V enterexplainedtojournalistsandcongressmenalikethat“Celera
0smissionistobecomethedefinitivesourceofgenomicandmedicalinformationintheworld.
0049AlthoughV enterrepeatedlystressedthathewouldbereleasinghissequencedataintothepublicdomaineverythreemonths,bothacademicsandinvestorswereskeptical.50Howwouldhemakeanymoney?
Venter justiﬁed giving away the raw DNA sequence as an opportunity for something bigger. In answering
his skeptics, he would explain:
45Id. at 64.
46Id. at 117.
47Sulston, supra, at 151.
48Id. at 154.
49Shreeve, supra, at 172.
50Sulston, supra, at 149.
16We’re not a biotech. We’re an information company, like LexisNexis. If you had the time,
you could ﬁnd the same information they have on your own. So why do they have two million
subscribers? Because they’ve already done the legwork for you, so you can ﬁnd what you
want in seconds rather than hours. We’re going to do the same for genomic information, on
a global scale.51
Although the basic human sequence would be free, the other information in Celera’s database would not. Ven-
ter realized that the real value in sequencing the human genome would be the discovery of how genetic vari-
ability predisposes a person to disease. Venter envisioned a future where not only biotech and pharmaceutical
companies would log on to Celera’s database, but also family doctors and laypeople interested in individual-
ized medicine.52PEandTonyWhitewerebetting$300milliononthisvision,althoughtheywerehedgingitwithhundredsofpatentapplications.
Intimately familiar with Venter’s schizophrenic past, the leaders of the HGP again weren’t buying any Ven-
ter’s rhetoric. They couldn’t help but think of Venter’s initial opposition to the Bermuda Accord. Moreover
even if Venter was sincere about wanting to give the genome away for free, the HGP leaders suspected that he
would eventually “ﬁnd himself shackled by the interests of his shareholders.”53AttheannualColdSpringHarborsymposium,JamesWatsonopenlycomparedV enter
0smovetoHitler
0sinvasionofPolandandurgedFrancisCollinstobeChurchillratherthanChamberlain.54
The HGP community was right to worry. With $300 million and a ﬂeet of sequencers that hadn’t even hit
the market, Venter seemed capable of completing the genome by 2001 and leaving the public program in
the dust. The one big question mark in Celera’s plan was its planned use of the “whole genome shotgun”
method. Again, to avoid getting bogged down in the biology, it suﬃces to say that although Venter had used
this method to successfully sequence microbial genomes at TIGR, most scientists in the HGP community
52Id. at 170.
53Id. at 124.
54Sulston, supra, at 151.
17felt that it could not be used to assemble the human genome. Venter recognized this risk and decided to
sequence the fruit ﬂy, Drosophila melanogaster, as a pilot project.55
Although the idea of losing the race to Celera was bad enough, Collins realized that there wouldn’t be any race
at all if the Republican Congress determined that the private-sector could handle the job.56Obviouslysensingthisopportunityhimself,V entersetupameetinginearly1999withCongressmanJohnPorter,chairoftheHousesubcommitteeresponsibleforNIHappropriations.57AssumingCelera
0sintentiontomakethehumangenomefreelyavailable,PorteraskedV enterforhisopinionastothenecessityofthepublicprogram.V entersuggestedthatifCelerademonstratedtheefficacyofthe“wholegenomeshotgunmethod,
00theNIHshouldshiftitsfocusfromsequencingtodiscoveringthebiologicalfunctionsofthegenesinstead.58WhenCollinslearnedofthismeeting,herealizedthatV enterwasjockeyingtohavetheHGPshutdown.Thethreatofthehumangenomesequencebeingcontrolled,andconceivablypatented,byV enter
0sgroupmotivatedtheHGPleaderslikeneverbefore.TheydeclaredwaronCelera.
Whereas a few years earlier the idea of assigning the sequencing to only a few labs was politically unpopular,
it was now seen as a necessity. Collins not only limited the sequencing to his three most productive genome
centers, but he also radically increased their funding (the DOE and Wellcome Trust matched this increase for
their respective labs as well).59Collinsalsomadethecontroversialdecisiontoabandonthe“finishasyougo
00strategywhichgeneratedthehighestqualitysequencepossible.ToturnthetablesonCelera,theHGPwouldfocusentirelyonproducinga“workingdraft
00bythespringof2000.60AswhentheSulston/Waterstonworkingdrafthadbeenproposed,manyfearedthatbyputtingalloftheirmoneyintothecreationofadraft,therewouldbeneithermoneynorincentivetofinishthejoblater.Y et,Collinsdefendedhisdecision:
We are in mortal danger of going out of existence. Think what’s going to happen, early
next summer. Celera could have ninety percent of their genome done. If we continue trying
to ﬁnish as we go along, we’ll have a third of ours. We can shout ourselves blue in the face
that our one-third is a hundred times better quality than their ninety percent, but it won’t
make any diﬀerence. Folks won’t understand the diﬀerence. They’ll just be looking at who
won a race.61
Collins simply felt that the HGP no longer had a choice.
55Shreeve, supra, at 52.
56Sulston, supra, at 161.
57Shreeve, supra, at 185.
58Id.
59Id. at 187.
60Id. at 191.
18Collins responded politically as well. At a budget meeting before Congressman Porter’s subcommittee,
Collins was asked point blank why the federal government should continue to fund the public program
in light of Venter’s claims.62 Collins was ready with a two-part response. First, he explained why the
whole-genome shotgun method was unlikely to succeed. Unlike the public program which was proceeding
chromosome by chromosome, Celera was randomly sequencing human DNA in the hope that it could later
assemble all of the pieces. Yet, due to the vast number of repeated sequences in the human genome, the
HGP community had great doubts that it would work.
Although there was no doubt that Celera’s method would generate a huge amount of DNA sequence, the
patentability of that data was Collins’s second concern. He explained to Congress:
Many in the scientiﬁc community are concerned about a circumstance where large amounts
of this critical information might, in some way, be constrained from utilization by everybody
who wants to use it. It is such basic information, and the notion that it would, in some way,
be moving out of a public domain enterprise into a single private company has raised some
cautions in the minds of many of my advisors.63
Within a matter of weeks, the public program had received its money.
Ironically, the ﬁrst thing the HGP did with its new funds was purchase hundreds of PE’s new sequencers (caus-
ing people to speculate that this had been the purpose of creating Celera in the ﬁrst place).64Meanwhile,V entercontinuedtobattleinthepress.AfteraccusingCollinsoflyingaboutCelera
0spatentintentionsinordertoincreasetheHGP
0sbudget,V enterexplainedthathewasn
0tworriedaboutthepublicprogram
0snewleaseonlife.Infact,heseemedtotakegreatjoyinpointingoutthefactthat,duetoBermudaAccord,CeleracoulddownloadtheHGP
0sdatanightlyandsavemillionsinsequencingcosts.65Ofcourse,theHGPwouldnothavethesameopportunitysinceV enter
0ssequencewouldnotbedownloadable.66
62Shreeve, supra, at 192.
64Id. at 194.
65Shreeve, supra, at 199.
66Id. at 205.
19Although publicly a picture of conﬁdence, Venter knew his business plan had taken some serious knocks. As
much as he hated to admit it, the HGP’s ramp-up had killed Celera’s revenues. No sensible drug company
was willing to sign a long term contract to Celera’s database before seeing the quality of the HGP’s working
draft.67Tomakemattersworse,inApril1999,theWellcomeTrustandtenpharmaceuticalcompanieshadformedanonprofitconsortiumtolocatesinglenucleotidepolymorphisms(SNPs)andputthemintothepublicdomain.68V enterhadnevermaintainedthatCelerawouldmaketheSNPsitdiscoveredfreelyavailable.Onthecontrary,hisvisionofCeleraasaone−stopshoppingportalforgenomicinformationreliedonhiscontrolofthesespotsofgeneticvariabilitywithinthehumanpopulation.
None of this was lost on Robert Millman, Celera’s chief patent attorney. He began to lobby PE’s management
for a more aggressive stance on Celera’s intellectual property. The USPTO had recently issued the ﬁrst patent
on an expressed sequence tag (EST) to Incyte.69Althoughinvalidationinthefederalcourtsremainedpossible,Millmanadvisedfilingpatentapplicationsoneverythingandanything.Thisstrategyofdefensivepatentingwouldcostlittleonthefrontendsinceprovisionalapplicationscouldbefiledforaslittleas$150each.70Furthermore,bypassingthisopportunitycouldhauntPEinthelongrun.RobertMillman,“FrancisCollins
0sworstnightmare,
00hadcapturedTonyWhite
0sfullattention.71
E. Mudslinging and Pizza Diplomacy
With the HGP and Celera paranoid of each other and churning out DNA sequence at unprecedented rates, the
race quickly turned into a battle of press releases and mud-slinging. In September 1999, the NHGRI and Well-
come Trust reaﬃrmed that the public program was on track to deliver “the ﬁrst draft of the genetic blueprint
67Id. at 265.
68Shreeve, supra, at 213.
69Id. at 229.
70Id. at 232.
71Id. at 235.
20of humankind” by the spring of 2000.72InJanuary,V enterheldhisownbriefingandannouncedthathiscompanyhadcompleted90%ofthegenome.73Celera
0spressreleasealsonotedthatithadfiledprovisionalpatentapplicationson6,500newgenefragments.IncludedasanattempttocreatesomebuzzforCelera
0ssaggingstockprice,thepatentapplicationannouncementhadtheoppositeeffectbyimplyingthatCelerawasgoingintocompetitionwithitsownclients.74FromtheHGP
0spointofview,Celera
0spressreleaseconfirmedwhattheyhadsuspectedallalong−−V enterwantedtoseizecontrolofthegenome.ManyacademicstooktheopportunitytopubliclyaccuseV enterofbreakinghispromisetopatentonlyafewhundredgenes.75
Things got worse for Celera and the NASDAQ on March 14, 2000. President Clinton and Prime Minis-
ter Blair had issued a joint statement declaring that “the raw, fundamental data of the human genome,
including the human DNA sequence and its variations, should be made freely available to scientists every-
where.”76ThestatementhadbeenwrittenbyastaffmemberoftheNHGRIand,althoughitexplicitlysupported“gene−basedinventions,
00itwasbeingmisreportedascallingfortheeliminationofallgenepatents.77TheentireNASDAQwasinafreefall.AlthoughFrancisCollinswasassignedtodamagecontrol,hecouldn
0thelpremarkingthat“animportantprincipleaboutaccesstothehumangenomesequence−−ourcommon,sharedheritageashumanbeings−−isbeingendorsedbytheleadersofthefreeworld.
0078Bytheday
0send,Celerahadlostover$2billioninmarketvalue.
To make an already long story slightly shorter, the mud-slinging between the two camps continued to worsen,
with the language getting nastier and nastier. With paranoia at an all time high, each group lived in constant
fear that the other would make a preemptive announcement of completion. The major problem with the end-
less rounds of press releases was that they had locked both groups into unrealistic time frames. The NIH found
itself in a bind. If Celera declared victory ﬁrst, its reputation would suﬀer in the eyes of Congress. Yet, if
Collins and the HGP went public with a shoddy version of the human genome, the repercussions might be even
worse.79Intensepoliticalpressuredevelopedtogetbothgroupstothenegotiatingtable. Afteranumberoffailedcollaborationattempts,themanwhosuccessfullyplayedtheroleofmediatorturnedouttobeAriPatrinosoftheDOE.PatrinoshadremainedamutualfriendofbothCollinsandV enterandconvincedthembothtocometohishome.
72Shreeve, supra, at 290.
73Id. at 312.
74Id. at 304.
75Id. at 303.
76Shreeve, supra, at 321.
77Id. at 322.
78Id. at 323.
79Shreeve, supra, at 332.
21After both leaders articulated their demands, it again became apparent that collaboration would not be possi-
ble. However, Patrinos noticed that both men expressed frustration with the sense of feeling rushed to ﬁnish.
He suggested that instead of collaborating, the two groups could simply announce the completion of their re-
spective genomes at the same time.80BothCollinsandV enterwereintriguedbytheideaandagreedtocomebackthefollowingweek. Afteracoupleofmoregatherings
over pizza at Patrinos’s house, the two generals of the genome war had declared a truce. Collins and Venter
agreed that both groups would write their own paper and that publication should occur in the September 2000
edition of Science. As usual, the point of contention was public access to the data. Although Venter refused to
deposit his sequence into GenBank for security reasons, he agreed to make it viewable for free on Celera’s web-
site.81BothV enterandCollinsagreedtorefrainfromanyfurtherdisparagingremarksabouttheother
0swork.Finally,thetwomenagreedtostandsidebysideasPresidentClintonannouncedthecompletionofthehumangenomeataWhiteHousepressconferenceonJune26,2000.82
The public announcement and celebration at the White House went smoothly. The two camps had one more
squabble over the speciﬁcs of Celera’s data release, which eventually lead to the HGP publishing its genome
in Nature as opposed to Science (but still on the same day).83 While scientists on each side of the fence
continued to argue about whose data was “better,” from the public’s perspective, the race ended as a tie
that day in the White House.
§2. Introduction to the Patent System and Its Role in Biotechnology
The story of the race to capture the genome is a fascinating mix of science, business, and politics. Since
80Id. at 342.
81Id. at 345.
82Id. at 350.
83Sulston, supra, at 234-35.
22I’m preparing to leave HLS for a career in patent law, I was particularly struck by the role that patents (or
the threat of them from the public program’s perspective) played in stimulating the race. The more I read,
the more I liked analogizing patent protection to the race’s starting gun. Yet, the deeper question I want to
explore further is whether the ﬁring of that gun resulted in a “clean race.” In other words, does the patent
system work properly to protect both innovation and the public domain in the context of biotechnology
generally and DNA sequence inventions speciﬁcally? If not, could any changes be made to strike a better
balance?
Although the scientists from the HGP “triumphed” in the sense that the bare-bones sequence, i.e. the
complete genetic blueprint to build a human, was made available to the public, it’s clear that this sequence
information is just the beginning of the road. Private entities in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries now want to utilize this information to create life-saving drugs and therapeutics. However, the
costs of R&D and FDA approval are monumental. This great capital expenditure can only be undertaken
with the assurance of patent protection. As Bruce Lehman, the former commissioner of the PTO explained,
“there are few subjects of greater importance to the development of biotechnology than the issuance of
patents.”84 Before we can explore the question of how smoothly the patent system is currently working
in the context of genetic inventions, an introduction to (A) the justiﬁcations for the patent system, (B)
biotechnology as intellectual property, and (C) DNA as patentable subject matter will be helpful.
84Bruce Lehman, Major Biotechnology Issues for the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, 33 Cal. W. L. Rev. 49, 50 (1996).
23A. Justiﬁcations for the Patent System
The best-known and most widely accepted justiﬁcation for the patent system is utilitarian in nature.
Patents are necessary to incentivize the creation and public dissemination of new technology and knowledge.
Without the government-granted monopoly right, an inventor would not be able to recoup her research and
development costs since her competitors could “pirate” her idea and sell the invention for a lower cost. The
creation of these new technologies, which often make life easier, is generally understood to be a good thing.
However, there are certainly trade-oﬀs that come with the patent system. Perhaps the biggest is what’s
known in the language of law and economics as “deadweight loss.”
Deadweight loss can be understood by imagining a world without patents (or alternatively by examining
what happens to the price of a technology after its patent expires). Since competitors would be allowed to
enter the market, the price of the invention would drop to just above its marginal cost (i.e. the actual cost
of building the product). With a drop in price, more people would be able to purchase and beneﬁt from
the invention. However, as described above, the absence of patent protection would prevent the creation of
new technology in the ﬁrst place since inventors would not be able to recoup their costs. So, by allowing the
patentee to charge the monopoly price, society necessarily must swallow the “deadweight loss” experienced
by people who are denied the beneﬁt of the invention because they have been priced out of the market. This
loss isn’t such a big deal when we are talking about fourth-graders who can’t aﬀord the latest and greatest
skateboard wheels; but it is very much “real” in the context of HIV drugs. Regardless of the speciﬁc type of
technology, the point is that the utilitarian theory of patent rights accepts this disutility (which lasts for the
length of the patent term) because it assumes that society is coming out ahead overall by having incentivized
the creation of the technology in the ﬁrst place.
24Patent rights may also be defended using deontological arguments. These arguments justify the existence
of patents through a basic right to one’s own intellectual property. Although not as popular as the utilitar-
ian justiﬁcation, two in particular merit description. The ﬁrst is John Locke’s notion of natural property
rights.85AccordingtoLocke,apersonacquirespropertythroughmixinghislaborwithanun−ownedresource.Byextension,aninventionproperlybelongstoitsinventorbecauseitisaproductofhislabor.Asacorollary,objectsthatcan
0tbemodifiedbyhumanlabormaynotbetakenoutofthepoolofcommonresources.We
0llseeinthenextsectionthatthe“productsofnature
00restrictiononpatentablesubjectmatterreflectsasimilaridea.
The second helpful deontological justiﬁcation can be called “personality theory” and has been articulated
best by Margaret Jane Radin86andJeremyWaldron.87 According to this theory, property rights are morally
justiﬁed because they enable a person to develop a “life plan” and fully express oneself. Although this
theory is normally used to justify the existence of private property rights, I will refer to it below in support
of possible limitations on the private ownership of certain types of genes.
85David B. Resnik, Owning the Genome: A Moral Analysis of DNA Patenting 35-36 (2004).
86Margaret J. Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1002-08 (1982).
87Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Ch. 8 (1988).
25B. The History of Biotechnology as Intellectual Property
The ability to obtain product-patent protection for biological materials has its roots in the 1980 Supreme
Court holding in Diamond v. Chakrabraty.88 In 1972, Ananda Chakrabarty applied for a patent on a new
bacterium that he had created (through breeding – not, as popularly believed, through recombinant DNA
technology) that was able to degrade crude oil more eﬃciently than any natural strain. He thought that
these bacteria could be used to assist the clean-up following an oil spill.
His application was rejected by the Patent and Trademark Oﬃce (PTO) because, at that time, living
organisms such as bacteria and animals were considered unpatentable “products of nature” under 35 U.S.C. §
101.89 Examining the legislative history of § 101, the Supreme Court noted that a 1952 Congressional Report
explained that “anything under the sun that is made by man” should be patentable subject matter.90 The
Court adopted this broad construction and held Chakrabarty’s bacterium to be patentable subject matter
since “[h]is discovery is not nature’s handiwork, but his own.”91 Following Chakrabarty, the fact that an
invention is a living organism is irrelevant under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
In its opinion, the Supreme Court rejected the PTO’s argument that since genetic technology was unfore-
88Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 65 L. Ed. 2d 144, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193 (1980).
8935 U.S.C. § 101 states: “Whoever invents or discovers any useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter
or any new and useful improvements thereof, may obtain a patent therefore subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” This provision provides the statutory basis for both the patentable subject matter and utility requirements.
90Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. The Court explained further: “This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it
embraces every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable.”
91Id. at 310.
26seeable at the time of § 101’s enactment, the patentability of genetic inventions should be a decision left
to Congress. The Court acknowledged that Congress would obviously have the power to alter the limits of
patentability; but, citing Marbury v. Madison, noted it was the Court’s job to interpret the version of § 101
currently in eﬀect. Commenting on the amicus briefs submitted in support of the PTO’s position, the Court
remarked:
The briefs present a gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel laureates,
are quoted suggesting that genetic research may pose a serious threat to the human race, or,
at the very least, that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such research to proceed
apace at this time. We are told that genetic research and related technological developments
may spread pollution and disease, that it may result in a loss of genetic diversity, and that
its practice may tend to depreciate the value of human life.92
Pleading incompetence, the Court responded by ﬁrst stating that these arguments were matters of high
policy appropriately left to the legislative process. Secondly, the Court stated that their decision as to
patentability would not put an end to genetic research, but may simply “determine whether research eﬀorts
are accelerated by the hope of reward or slowed by the want of incentives.”93
To say that the Chakrabarty decision simply “accelerated” biotechnological research eﬀorts would be a huge
understatement. Private biomedical research and development (R&D) rose from $2 billion per year in
1980 to $50 billion per year in 2000.94 This huge rise in venture capital funding can be explained by the
new protection aﬀorded by the biotechnology patents pouring out of the PTO. Post-Chakrabarty, the PTO
has issued utility patents on all sorts of biological materials including plants, multi-cellular organisms as
93Id. at 317.
94Resnik, supra, at 3. Note that this was also the year of the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. It seems that Chakrabarty and
Bayh-Dole have acted synergistically.
27“advanced” as rhesus monkeys, human stem cells, proteins, and, as we shall see in the next, DNA.95
C. The Current Status of DNA as Statutory Subject Matter
Moral arguments aside, the legal question as to the patentability of genetic inventions has been resolved
in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the exclusive appellate court for questions of law speciﬁc
to patents) in favor of patentability. Although all of the requirements under the Patent Act (statutory
subject matter, utility, novelty, written description, enablement, and nonobviousness) must be met before
the issuance of any patent, the prohibition against “products of nature” as statutory subject matter under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is the ﬁrst hurdle for any application that claims a DNA sequence invention.96
The Federal Circuit explained in the 1991 case of Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. that ap-
plications for gene patents may only claim puriﬁed and isolated DNA sequences since only they qualify as
products of human ingenuity under Chakrabarty. 97 In that case, the Court aﬃrmed the validity of Amgen’s
patent which claimed: “a puriﬁed and isolated DNA sequence consisting essentially of a DNA sequence
encoding human erythropoietin” (emphasis added).98The Court emphasized the point by noting that “[i]t
is important to recognize that neither Fritsch nor Lin [the two inventors ﬁghting for priority in the case]
95The PTO has stated that “a claim directed to or including within its scope a human being will not be considered to be
patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.” Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425, aﬀ’d, 846 F.2d 77 (1998). The
commissioner stated that such a claim is prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution. See Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, Policy Statement on Patentability of Animals, 1077 Oﬀ. Gaz. Pat Oﬃce 24 (Apr. 7, 1987).
96John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 Science 689-90 (1998).
97See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1016 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 856 (1991).
98U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008, October 27, 1987 (DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin).
28invented EPO or the EPO gene.”99Becausegenepatentsarelimitedtothe “puriﬁed and isolated” forms of speciﬁc
DNA sequences (as distinct from the chromosomes in which they exist in nature), holders of such patents
have no leverage over you or me since our genes are in their “natural state.” In other words, an average Joe
walking down the street can’t infringe a gene patent simply because his body is operating normally.
As tempting as it is to say that this is mere semantics, there is a good policy rationale behind it. Furthermore,
this problem is not unique to biotechnology. Many chemicals that exist in nature in an impure or mixed
state can become new and useful when put into a puriﬁed form. For example, in 1958 the Fourth Circuit
upheld the patentability of puriﬁed Vitamin B-12.100Onecommentatorhasexplained:
This is not simply a lawyer’s trick, but a persuasive response to the intuition that patents
should only issue for human inventions. It prevents the issuance of patents that take away
from the public things that they were previously using (such as the DNA that resides in their
cells), while allowing patents to issue on new human manipulations of nature. Those of us
who simply use the DNA in our own cells, as our ancestors have been doing for generations,
should not and need not worry about patent infringement liability. On the other hand, those
of us who get injections of recombinant insulin or erythropoietin should in fairness expect
to pay a premium to the inventors who made these technological interventions possible.101
In summary, although patent lawyers continue to argue over other requirements for patentability (which will
be addressed below), the legal status of puriﬁed and isolated DNA sequences as statutory subject matter is
secure within the federal courts.
§3. Policy Arguments For and Against DNA Patents
A. The Bayh-Dole Rationale in Support of DNA Patents
99Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1206.
100Merck & Co. v. Olin Matheison Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958).
29The general utilitarian argument for patents can easily be applied to the ﬁeld of biotechnology. As described
above, the most-widely accepted justiﬁcation for the patent system is two-fold. First, patents incentivize
innovation by allowing inventors to recoup their costs (and often much more) in the form of monopoly proﬁts.
Second, by requiring full disclosure of the invention as part of the quid pro quo for the monopoly grant, the
patent system places the fresh knowledge immediately into the pubic domain so that others may learn from
it (as opposed to trade secret protection). Applying this “incentive rationale” to genetic research causes a
couple of criticisms to quickly emerge.
An initial criticism is that geneticists don’t need this kind of incentive. Indeed, the gut reaction is that
people who go into the ﬁelds of biology or chemistry usually do so because they have a genuine love for the
work, not because they are chasing dollar signs (granted this may be changing due to the increased presence
of intellectual property law). The recognition they have traditionally sought has been in the form of awards
or peer-review publications. However, this criticism misses the point that genetic research is extremely
expensive. Although not all of these researchers are in it for stock options, the capital clearly must come
from somewhere.
In other words, the prospect of patent protection creates an incentive for capital formation in high-tech indus-
tries like biotechnology (where discoveries by scientist-employees are assigned to the corporation-employer
by contract). Biotechnology patents, of which DNA patents are a signiﬁcant part, have allowed the in-
dustry to ﬂourish. In 1999 alone, the industry spent $11 billion on R&D and accounted for 437,000 U.S.
jobs.102TheseeconomicbenefitsarecertainlytangiblehereinBoston,aswellasmanyothercitiesinourcountry.ThefederalgovernmentalonecouldnotmatchthecurrentlevelofprivateR&Dfundingunlessitcutotherexpendituresorraisedtaxessignificantly.EvenifthegovernmentcouldfundallR&D,Iwouldoptagainstitsincecompetitionyieldsbetterproductsmorequickly.
102Resnik, supra, at 68.
30I do not mean to belittle the role that the federal government plays in funding basic science research. In
fact, the federal government’s funding of basic science is so signiﬁcant that it serves as the basis for a second
major objection to DNA patents. Critics of gene patents argue that since the government often pays for the
research leading to the discovery of these genes, the genes should belong to the government. In other words,
it is unfair to make taxpayers pay monopoly prices to private companies when those companies didn’t incur
the expenses that resulted in the discovery. The answer to this criticism is not intuitive and requires an
explanation of the rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.103
Before the Bayh-Dole Act, it was very diﬃcult to transfer discoveries that were made with federal funds to the
private sector.104Theproblemwasnotthatbasicsciencediscoveriesweren
0tbeingmade,butratherthatnodownstreamproductsortreatmentswerebeingdeveloped.Privateindustryremainedonthesidelinesbecauseithadnopatentprotectiontorecoverthedownstreamcostsof(1)developingthedrugand(2)gettingFDAapproval.
As we learned in winter-term, pharmaceutical products must go through three rounds of extensive clinical tri-
als before they may be prescribed to patients by doctors. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America claim that only 0.1% of compounds that demonstrate potential in animal testing reach clinical trials
in humans.105Onceattheclinicaltrialstage,onlyonedrugoutoffivereceivesFDAapproval.Theaveragecostofdevelopmentforanapproveddrugis$500,000,000.106Thesefiguresdemonstratehowimportantpatentprotectionistothesuccessofbothpharmaceuticalandbiotechnologicalfirmsalike.Furthermore,withoutpatentprotectionsmallbiotechnologyfirmswouldhaveno
10335 U.S.C. §§ 200 et seq., P.L. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980). The Policy and Objective section states: “It is the policy
and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of small business ﬁrms in federally supported research and
development eﬀorts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonproﬁt organizations, including universities;
to ensure that inventions made by nonproﬁt organizations and small business ﬁrms are used in a manner to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to promote the commercialization and
public availability of inventions made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to ensure that the Government
obtains suﬃcient rights in federally supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and protect the public against
nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions; and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area.”
104See Who Owns Life?, supra, at 45.
105Pharmaceutical Research Manufacturers of America, Why Do Prescription Drugs Cost So Much?, available at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/publications/brochure/questions/questions.pdf
106See id.
31chance against the big pharmaceutical houses. Lead time advantage would be nothing compared to the awe-
some marketing and distribution capabilities of these international conglomerates.
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act allowed universities to patent their discoveries made with federal funds.
Congress decided that the universities were in a better position to license these rights (often exclusively) to the
appropriate players in the private sector. The result is that, by now, most research universities and nonproﬁts
receiving federal funds have established a technology transfer oﬃce to obtain and license their patent rights
(think Harvard Oncomouse). While many people, e.g. Jeremy Rifkin, continue to object to the Bayh-Dole
Act as a form of “corporate welfare,”107mostinthebiotechnologyindustry,includinganumberofin−housepatentcounselwithwhomIhavespokenwhileatHarvard,oftenrefertoitas“thelawthatcreatedtoday
0sbiotechindustry.
00
There can be little doubt that the Bayh-Dole Act, together with the Chakrabarty decision, facilitated the
deluge of private capital into biotechnology. I believe that the rationale for the Bayh-Dole Act demonstrates
why patent protection is necessary even if the discovery of a particular DNA sequence was discovered through
the use of federal funding. The fact that some people will be overly burdened by higher prices until the
patent expires is no doubt unfortunate. However, stepping back, I view this as a sacriﬁce that must be made
so that society may continue to beneﬁt from new products in the long run.108
Patents on DNA sequences have clearly produced economic and scientiﬁc beneﬁts through the bolstering of
the biotechnology industry. While there have been some tangible medical beneﬁts (mostly in the form of
107Resnik, supra, at 70.
108This paper presumes the continued existence of the U.S. patent system. However, commentators have discussed an alterna-
tive reward-based system. The potential beneﬁt of such a system is that, after the government pays the inventor her “reward,”
the technology would fall immediately into the public domain, thereby eliminating the deadweight loss. Although appealing, I
think this system would be administratively unworkable. For more on the idea of a “rewards system,” see Steven Shavell and
Tanguy van Ypersele, “Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights,” 44 J. of Law & Economics 525 (2001).
32diagnostics as opposed to treatments/cures), it must be admitted that medical science has not yet experienced
the full potential of the genomic revolution. Yet this is precisely why I feel that gene patents are important
enough to wrestle with some of the potentially adverse social messages discussed in the next few paragraphs.
Gene patents will provide the security for investment in “proteomics” – the next step in acquiring the
life-saving therapies of tomorrow.
As noted above, recognizing property rights in DNA sequences does not come without challenges. The
biggest danger in deciding that genes are patentable is that we are therefore also saying that genes are
marketable (since patents are usually obtained for commercial interests). Some ﬁnd this “commodiﬁcation”
immoral in itself. Others, including myself, feel that it has the potential to harm society if allowed to
run rampant. Explaining the commodiﬁcation objection to gene patents is tricky for a couple of reasons.
First, the word “gene” means diﬀerent things to diﬀerent groups of people. For example, a patent lawyer
in court might say that a gene is a “mere chemical” since that is how the legal system has thus far treated
it.109Ontheotherhand,apreacheratthepulpitmightdefineageneas“thesacredworkofGod
0shand.
00Second,theconceptof“commodification,
00bestdescribedbyRadin,iscomplex.Commodificationcanbe“incomplete
00whenbothmarketandnonmarketunderstandingscoexist.Furthermore,commodificationcanbeunderstoodinbothnarrow(itemisactuallyboughtandsold)andbroad(itemsarediscussedinmarketterms)senses.110Regardlessofhowoneendsupdefiningthespecifictermsabove,i.e.whetheryouviewcommodificationasadeontologicalargumentagainstgenepatentsorinsteadasafactorinautilitariancalculus,theobjectionitselfboilsdowntothebeliefthatmarketlanguageshouldnotbeappliedtohumantraits.
Why not? At the risk of butchering some basic metaphysics (not my forte), the danger in the commodiﬁcation
of genes is that we risk blurring the Kantian distinction between “the self and its properties as a subject, and
the nonself as objects.”111LikeKant,Ibelievethatallpeopleshouldbetreatedas“subjects
00ofequalworthandintrinsicvalue.Byextension,Idonotbelievethatindividualsareabletobeassigneda“marketvalue.
00Theriskinherentinpermittinggenepatentsisthatwewilldrifttowardassigningamarketvaluetopeoplebasedupontheirgeneticmake−up.
109See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1206 (“A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one...”).
110See Who Owns Life?, supra, at 166.
111Id. at 168.
33As a side-note, I view this argument as a sort of anti-“personality theory” argument. Normally, Radin’s
personality theory is used to support the establishment of property rights because those rights are necessary
to freely express one’s personhood. Here, the opposite might occur if we accept that gene patents will result
in the valuation of human traits. In other words, the creation of patent rights in genes might limit a person’s
autonomy because he will either label himself or be labeled by others as inferior.
Although I do think commodiﬁcation is a real threat that merits a watchful eye and/or future regulation, I
don’t buy this autonomy argument for two reasons. First, I think gene patenting would likely result in incom-
plete commodiﬁcation. We must be careful not to overlook the fact that we can treat something as having
both a market value and a nonmarket value. For example, although I might insure my own life for one million
dollars, I would not believe that this was my “true worth.” 112Similarly,thefairmarketvalueofmy“height
00genemightnotbeatruemeasureofhowIvaluemyownheight.Becausemarketandnonmarketunderstandingcancoexist,thenegativeeffectofthecommodificationargumentislesscertain.Second,thecommodificationobjectionpresumesthatsocietywilladoptamentalityof“geneticreductionismthatequatespersonswithgenes.
00113Y et,comparingacoupleofidenticaltwinswillimmediatelytellyouthatgenescan
0tbeeverything.Personally,I
0mskepticalthatwewilleverlosethenotionthatapersonisgreaterthanthesumofhisparts.Thiscutsagainstthecommodificationargumentinthatwemightnotbeasquicktovalueapersonbysimplytallyingupthevalueofhergenes.
B. Do We Have A “Tragedy of the Anticommons?”
Although I do not think the potential for adverse social consequences described above justiﬁes prohibiting
patents on DNA inventions (and therefore slowing down the delivery of new, life-saving treatments and
products), other critics have questioned the premise that patents always facilitate the delivery of new health
care products. Professors Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg of the University of Michigan have articu-
lated an argument whereby the increase in intellectual property rights due to the privatization of biomedical
112Resnik, supra, at 100.
113Who Owns Life?, supra, at 168.
34research “may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving human health.”114 Their argument
is a spin-oﬀ of the “tragedy of the commons” metaphor in which a scarce resource is overused because the
government allows too many individuals access to it. The ﬂip-side is the “tragedy of the anticommons” in
which the resource is underutilized because the government has granted too many people the right to exclude
others from using it.
Heller and Eisenberg note that biomedical research has been moving from a “commons model” to a “priva-
tization model:”
Under the commons model, the federal government sponsored premarket or “upstream”
research and encouraged broad dissemination of results in the public domain. Unpatented
biomedical discoveries were freely incorporated in “downstream” products for diagnosing
and treating disease. In 1980, in an eﬀort to promote commercial development of new
technologies, Congress began encouraging universities and other institutions to patent dis-
coveries arising from federally supported research and development and to transfer their
technology to the private sector. Supporters applaud the resulting increase in patent ﬁl-
ings and private investment, whereas critics fear deterioration in the culture of upstream
research.115
Clearly what is being distinguished here is the same diﬀerence in ideology between the two camps in the
race for the human genome, i.e. the diﬀerence between the Bermuda Accord and the Celera business plan.
James Watson, Francis Collins, and the rest of the HGP leaders were accustomed to the “commons model”
of government sponsored research wherein all ﬁndings were put into the public domain. On the other hand,
Craig Venter, Tony White, and Robert Millman have “gone with the ﬂow” and embraced the Bayh-Dole
model of product development.
114Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
Science 698-701.
35Although Heller and Eisenberg acknowledge that “patents and other forms of intellectual property for up-
stream discoveries may fortify incentives to undertake risky research projects and could result in a more
equitable distribution of proﬁts across all stages of R&D,” they seem consumed by the potential dangers
of the Bayh-Dole or “privatization model.”116Commentingonhowtheybelievefilingpatentsisa necessity today for
researchers, Heller and Eisenberg note:
Upstream patent rights, initially oﬀered to help attract further private investment, are
increasingly regarded as entitlements by those who do research with public funds. A re-
searcher who may have felt entitled to coauthorship or a citation in an earlier era may now
feel entitled to be a coinventor on a patent or to receive a royalty under a material transfer
agreement. The result has been a spiral of overlapping patent claims in the hands of diﬀerent
owners, reaching ever further upstream in the course of biomedical research. Researchers
and their institutions may resent restrictions on access to the patented discoveries of others,
yet nobody wants to be the last one left dedicating ﬁndings to the public domain.117
According to their argument, the privatization of upstream biomedical research has the potential to create
anticommons property. This is problematic because future research may be obstructed if it requires getting
a license from too many patentees from earlier discoveries.
Heller and Eisenberg are careful to distinguish this underutilization from the normal underuse that naturally
accompanies a patentee’s ability to charge the monopoly price for her invention. In other words, the tragedy
of the anticommons is not equivalent to the “deadweight loss” discussed at the start of this paper as an
inherent part of the patent system. Instead:
The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex obstacles that arise when a user
needs access to multiple patented inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream
patent allows its owner to set up a tollbooth on the road to product development, adding
to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical invention.118
116Id.
36Heller and Eisenberg believe that their anticommons “tollbooth” model strongly suggests against the issuing
of patents on gene fragments.
They begin their case by calling attention to the signiﬁcant change in DNA sequencing technology that oc-
curred in the late 1980s/early 1990s (largely due to the work of Michael Hunkapiller at Perkin Elmer).119Beforethecreationofthisnew
high-throughput DNA sequencing, DNA sequences found in patent claims generally consisted of cloned
genes that were used to produce the protein of interest via recombinant DNA technology. For exam-
ple, as we saw above, Amgen (in perhaps the most successful cloned-gene patent of all time) claimed
“a puriﬁed and isolated DNA sequence encoding erythropoietin.”120Sinceitownsthe exclusive rights to the
“puriﬁed and isolated” gene, only Amgen can put the gene into bacteria to make the protein. EPO has
not only made incredible proﬁts for Amgen, but has saved the lives of countless anemic patients world-
wide. The point is that before the early 1990s, patents on genes “generally corresponded closely to fore-
seeable commercial products, such as therapeutic proteins or diagnostic tests for recognized genetic dis-
eases.”121Inotherwords,functionsfortheseDNAsequenceswerealreadyknownatthetimeoftheirpatentapplicationfiling. The fed-
eral courts analogized these “cloned gene” DNA sequences to chemicals, and used the prior case law on
chemical inventions to resolve patent law issues in the DNA sequence context.122
The strategy for ﬁling DNA sequence patent applications radically changed after the adoption of high-
throughput DNA sequencing. Ironically, the initiator of this change was none other than the NIH itself with
119Shreeve, supra, at 78.
120U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008, October 27, 1987 (DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin).
121Heller & Eisenberg, supra, at 699.
122See Amgen, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1206 (“A gene is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one...”).
37its controversial 1991 patent application on Craig Venter’s expressed sequence tags (ESTs). To refresh the
reader, an EST is a DNA sequence just long enough to demonstrate that it is a unique portion of the trans-
lated region of a gene. However, an EST tells nothing of either the location of the gene or the protein that it
encodes.123AlthoughtheNIHeventuallyabandoneditscontroversialapplication,privatefirmscontinuedtoclaimnewsequences“beforeidentifyingacorrespondinggene,protein,biologicalfunction,orpotentialcommercialproduct.
00124Therefore,unliketheDNAsequenceinventionsbeforethe
revolution in automated sequencers, these new claimed sequences “look less like new chemical entities than
they do like new scientiﬁc information,” a problem that will be examined in the next subsection.
The potential danger of granting patents on gene fragments is that:
Foreseeable commercial products, such as therapeutic proteins or genetic diagnostic tests,
are more likely to require the use of multiple fragments. A proliferation of patents on indi-
vidual fragments held by diﬀerent owners seems inevitably to require costly future transac-
tions to bundle licenses together before a ﬁrm can have an eﬀective right to develop these
products.125
Heller and Eisenberg are worried that downstream ﬁrms will be deterred from attempting to develop new
products because of the increased transaction costs that accompany the acquisition of multiple licenses.
There are a number of responses to Heller and Eisenberg’s “patent thicket” argument. The ﬁrst is that we’ve
essentially heard all of this before. John J. Doll, then director of the PTO’s Biotechnology Examination
Division, acknowledged (in the same issue of Science as the Heller and Eisenberg article) the many critics
against gene patents. Yet, he explained that in the PTO’s view:
123See Who Owns Life?, supra, at 76.
124Heller & Eisenberg, supra, at 699.
38New areas of technology do not create the need for a whole new specialized patent law.
In many ways, the arguments currently being used for DNA sequence technology resemble
those voiced 30 to 40 years ago when polymer chemistry was an emerging technology. At
that time, people argued that if broad generic claims were granted on the building blocks
of basic polymers, it would devastate the industry. In fact, no such disaster occurred.126
Any DNA sequence invention would still have to meet the individual patent law requirements, e.g. utility
and nonobviousness; but, in Doll’s opinion, if a gene fragment can do so, there is no reason why it should
be denied dominant status. The situation should be no diﬀerent than the following example:
A patent might be granted for compound X, which is disclosed to have a speciﬁc use (such
as a headache remedy). If other investigators ﬁnd that X has a new and unexpected use,
perhaps in combination with compound Y, for treatment of heart arrhythmias, they may
have to obtain a license from the individual who ﬁrst patented compound X in order to
sell XY...In summary, once a product is patented, that patent extends to any use, even
those that have not been disclosed in the patent. A future nonobvious method of using that
product may be patentable, but the ﬁrst patent would have been dominant.127
The problem with the Heller and Eisenberg argument is that it applies to any fundamental invention that
leads to further invention.
Dr. Randall Scott, who in 2000 was president and chief scientiﬁc oﬃcer of Incyte Genomics, used the
following example to rebut Heller and Eisenberg’s argument:
The invention of both the transistor and the integrated circuit enabled the microprocessor
industry, which has seen innovations by and patents issued to countless inventors. While
many of these inventions overlap, the industry has been able to work out cross-licensing
arrangements that have enabled the delivery of unprecedented computing power to the
general public. If one applied the reasoning of commentators like Professor Eisenberg,
then patents on the transistor and integrated circuit should never have been granted. The
diﬃculty with this reasoning, then, is that those inventions that are most fundamental, and
are presumably most worthy of patent protection, would be denied protection on the basis
that they are most likely to block further innovation by others.128
Scott would say that scientist/entrepreneurs like Venter and himself are involved in no Faustian bargain.
Instead, he believes that Incyte’s business model is accelerating the use of DNA sequence inventions by
39pharmaceutical, biotechnological, and academic researchers.
Scott explained to Congress:
At my company, Incyte, when we founded the company back in 1991, we were driven by
the principle that science was long and arduous. Identifying a biological function and then
painstakingly purifying the one molecule out of a commish of biological molecules was very
hard work. In eﬀect, we began operating on a diﬀerent principle, that we could take cells
and tissues of interesting biological meaning, such as prostrate cancer and normal prostrate
tissue, and start to scan thousands of genes and look at the diﬀerences between those genes,
[i.e.] which genes associated with diﬀerent diseases.129
Incyte made the novel decision (at the time) to focus solely on this important stage of drug development.
Whereas other companies were still fully vertically integrated, i.e. they performed all operations from target
discovery down through clinical trials, Incyte invested more and more money into DNA sequencing and
became better and better at generating results. Naturally, to protect its large investment, Incyte ﬁled and
obtained patent protection for its discoveries.
By 2000, Incyte had obtained nearly 500 gene patents (second only to the NIH). Considering those patents
to be an “incredible trust,” Incyte decided that they would only license those patents nonexclusively in both
the research and diagnostics ﬁelds. Furthermore, the company established a policy of licensing the patents
broadly, i.e. to anyone who asked.130Scottfeelsthat,byadoptingtheselicensingstrategies,Incytehas not only avoiding
becoming a “tollbooth” on the road to discovery, but has instead created an “EZ Pass” lane:
130Gene Patents and Other Genomic Inventions: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Congress 121 (2000).
40By essentially making this technology available broadly, we think we have added tremendous
value to industry and a tremendous value to society. We also believe that we’re seeing a
changing time in the pharmaceutical industry, just as we’ve seen in the computer industry.
In the early days of the computer industry, every company did everything. They made
their own chips. They made their own software. They had their own sales and distribution
network, but eﬀectively, as Intel and Microsoft and many companies came along, they began
to fragment that industry. Pretty soon it was discovered that it was much more eﬀective
for one company to make chips and sell them to all manufacturers.
You’re beginning to see some of that same inﬂuence in the pharmaceutical industry, where
in the past every company, every researcher, went all the way from A to Z, making the
discovery, screening and developing the compound, developing that drug. Companies like
ourselves no longer focus on the end product of manufacturing a drug and taking that to
the clinic and to the market, but rather on the early discovery phase and providing that as
a service to the entire industry. That’s been the basis of our company. We now have 18 out
of the top 20 pharmaceutical companies in the world already subscribed to our database.
They have licenses to all the genes that we’ve identiﬁed. They have those nonexclusively,
so they share with each other the capability to do research and to develop diagnostic and
therapeutics oﬀ of that information.131
Although today Incyte plans to take its drug candidates through proof-of-concept Phase I or IIa clinical trials,
it still relies on partnerships to advance through the ﬁnal stages of clinical development.132Regardless,mostbiotechnologyfirmsstilllicensetheirdrugtargetsandknow−howtopharmaceuticalcompanies.Withoutpatentprotection,
these ﬁrms could not continue to fund further research (nor could they have acquired venture capital funding
in the ﬁrst place).
C. Monopoly vs. Competition Theorists
Randall Scott’s position on avoiding duplicative waste is a relevant consideration to the ongoing debate
between economists as to whether broad protection for upstream discoveries is helpful in the long run for
generating mature downstream products. Here, we again ﬁnd two new labels that could be placed on the
132See http://www.incyte.com/drugs incyte approach.html.
41two diﬀerent camps of the race for the human genome – monopoly versus competition theorists.
On one side of the line are the monopoly theorists. They argue in favor of broad upstream protection, be-
lieving that ﬁrms will be incentivized to pursue development since they will not have to partake in “wasteful
patent races.”133Furthermore,monopoliesarebelievedtoencouragegreaterrisk−takingintermsofdownstreamdevelopmentbecauseoftheassuredrewardintheformofmonopolypricesiftheeventualproductisasuccess.Inthismodel,thepatenteemaydevelopthedownstreamproductherselfordirectthepaceanddirectionofdevelopmentthroughlicensingagreements.
Scott (and his business plan for Incyte) clearly fall into this camp in that he feels that it would be wasteful
for other ﬁrms to replicate Incyte’s work.
Competition theorists, on the other hand, contend that races to develop new technologies are not wasteful
(the fact that many of science’s greatest discoveries were accidental, e.g. the discovery of penicillin, lends
credence to this argument). Instead, they believe that greater competition will yield better products more
quickly. These theorists also point out the fact that a monopolist ﬁrm has no incentive to improve a product
that already dominates the market.134
According to professor Rai, broad monopoly protection is advantageous in the biopharmaceutical context due
to the high cost of bringing drugs market.135Thisconcernisverysimilartotheconcern(articulatedearlierinthispaper)aboutawardingpatentstoinstitutionsthatusedfederalfunding.There,itseemedwrongtomakethepublicpaymonopolypriceswhentheyhadfinancedtheR&Dthroughpayingtheirtaxes.However,therationalefor
awarding patent protection under the Bayh-Dole Act was not to encourage this initial innovation, but rather
to encourage ﬁrms to incur the great costs in developing and bringing a product to market. Furthermore, Rai
133Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 824 (2001).
134See id. at 825.
135See id. at 830.
42notes that these broad rights will likely be held by smaller biotechnology ﬁrms.136It
0sunlikelythatthesefirmswillfailtovigorouslydeveloptheirtechnologiessincetheyprobablywon
0talreadyhaveadominatingproductonthemarket.
Although Rai favors broad upstream patents within the biopharmaceutical industry, he is aware of the poten-
tial dangers that come with layers upon layers of licensing. Rai cites an article by Eisenberg that documents li-
censing diﬃculties between downstream pharma houses and upstream patentees.137Y et,thedangersarticulatedbyHellerandEisenbergaremostacutewhentheissuedpatentsareoverlybroad.
As we will see next, the PTO and federal courts have attempted to prevent such harmful patents through
the doctrines of patentability and infringement.
§4. The Law on Patentability and Infringement and Some Suggestions for Change
A. The Recent History of the Utility Requirement
Before an inventor can receive a patent, he must show that his invention is statutory subject matter,138useful,139novel,140nonobvioustoanordinarypractitionerintherelevantfield,141andadequatelydisclosed.142Thestatutorysubjectmatterrequirementwas
already discussed above in §2. To review, the Federal Circuit in Amgen determined that DNA is a chemical
136See id. at 831.
137See id. at 832.
13835 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
139Id.
14035 U.S.C. §102 (2000).
14135 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
14235 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
43that, when puriﬁed and isolated, is statutory subject matter.
The next requirement, utility, has played a crucial role in the debate over the patentability of genes and
gene fragments. Tracing the history of this requirement within the PTO throughout the course of the HGP
provides great insight into why private companies like Celera, Incyte, and Human Genome Sciences got “into
the game.” Furthermore, we’ll see that the PTO’s latest utility guidelines, when combined with the § 102
novelty requirement, have the potential to preclude certain patents on DNA sequences elucidated during the
HGP.
The utility requirement in patent law usually doesn’t have much bite. In the ﬁrst place, inventors (think
mechanical inventions here) don’t usually invent things that serve no purpose. Secondly, from an economic
perspective, even if such a patent were to issue, it wouldn’t be worth the paper it was printed on. However, the
utility doctrine takes on a more important role in the chemical and biological arts.143In Brenner v. Manson,
the Supreme Court held that chemical compounds are not useful per se.144TheCourtrejectedtheplaintiff
0sargumentthathiscompound(achemicalintermediateforasteroidhavinganti−tumorproperties)wasusefulforthereasonthatitcouldbeusedtofurtherscientificresearch,noting:
Such a patent may confer power to block oﬀ whole areas of scientiﬁc development, without
compensating beneﬁt to the public. The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Con-
stitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the beneﬁt derived by the
public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is reﬁned and
developed to this point – where speciﬁc beneﬁt exists in currently available form – there
is insuﬃcient justiﬁcation for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a
broad ﬁeld.145
143See Donald S. Chisum, Principles of Patent Law 729 (2d ed. 2001).
144Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531 (1966).
44Going further, the Court held that mere chemical resemblance to a useful compound was insuﬃcient to
demonstrate utility.
Although the holding in Brenner seems clear enough, over time the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
softened the utility requirement. The PTO went along with this softening and stated in its 1995 Utility Guide-
lines that the applicant need only assert a utility which “would be considered credible by one of ordinary skill
in the art.”146 In other words, the burden had now shifted to the PTO. Utility would be presumed unless the
PTO could show that a person having ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA) would consider the proﬀered utility
insuﬃcient. Scientists (following the lead of the earlier Venter/NIH application) began asserting that ESTs
(i.e. gene fragments) were useful in that they could serve as probes to ﬁnd the corresponding full-length genes.
When the PTO announced in 1997 that this utility was acceptable, the gold rush referred to many times in
the ﬁrst section of this paper reached its climax. By 1999, Incyte alone had ﬁled “applications covering 1.2
million partial gene fragments.”147ThePTOwasswampedandcriticslikeHellerandEisenbergwerebusypenningtheirpolemics.
Indeed, the PTO’s stance on ESTs seemed to ﬂy in the face of Brenner, and in 1999 it issued Revised Interim
Utility Guidelines (the ﬁnal version of which were promulgated in January 2001).148Althoughtheseguidelinesdonothavetheforceandeffectoflaw,theFederalCircuitrecentlyexplainedthatthey“maybegivenjudicialnoticetotheextenttheydonotconflictwiththestatute.
00149
The new guidelines signiﬁcantly raise the bar with regard to the utility requirement. Besides being “credible,”
146Notices, Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, Utility Examination Guidelines, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,263
(July 14, 1995).
147John Murray, Comment, Owning Genes: Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 Chi.- Kent. L. Rev. 231 (1999).
148Notices, Department of Commerce, Patent and Trademark Oﬃce, Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan.
5, 2001).
149Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting the PTO’s Guidelines for determining
compliance with the written description requirement).
45the utility proﬀered must now also be “substantial.” In Brenner, the Supreme Court deﬁned “substantial
utility” as when a “speciﬁc beneﬁt exists in currently available form.”150The new guidelines explain that the
use of an EST as a probe for ﬁnding the full-length DNA does not satisfy this test because it is not a “real
world use.” Therefore, without more, these sequences are no longer patentable.
B. The Novelty and Utility Requirements Together May Be Problematic
The novelty requirement in patent law is easy to grasp. In the plain words of Donald Chisum, author of
perhaps the most widely used treatise on patent law: “It makes no sense to grant someone a patent on an
invention that already exists.”151Thenoveltyrequirementisfoundin§102ofthestatute.Itstates(inrelevantpart)that:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless –
(a) the invention was known or used by others, or patented or described in a printed publi-
cation...before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication...or in public
use...more than one year prior to the date of the application...(emphasis added)152
§ 102(a) prevents someone from obtaining a patent when someone else had already made the claimed dis-
covery. § 102(b), on the other hand, forces an inventor to ﬁle a patent application within one year of making
the invention publicly known (notice here that the inventor herself destroys her ability to obtain a patent
by waiting too long to ﬁle an application). In other words, under 102(b), once an invention has been in the
public domain for more than a year, it may not be patented.
150Brenner, 383 U.S. at 531.
151Chisum, supra, at 335.
46The § 102(b) novelty requirement and the PTO’s stricter utility guidelines together form a roadblock for
the future ability to patent DNA sequences which were made public via the HGP. As we will see below,
the combination of these rules suggests that when scientists eventually do discover the biological function
of the full-length genes (to which today’s ESTs are simply a part), they will be limited to receiving only
improvement patents. Because improvement patents, as opposed to patents claiming the compound itself
(known as composition claims), are “not as easily enforced against patent infringers, they have the potential
to discourage investment in new drugs and pharmaceuticals.”153
The problem stems from the fact that scientists do not yet know the function for the vast majority of the
DNA sequence that was elucidated during the HGP. As described above, since these sequences do not meet
the speciﬁc and substantial utility tests under the altered PTO utility guidelines, i.e. they do not posses a
“real world use,” they may not be patented. Although researchers are working around the clock to discover
the biological function of genes associated with disease, § 102(b) stands over them like the Grim Reaper:
Subsections (a) and (b) of 102 prevent patents when the invention is known by others for
more than a year, regardless of who invents the product. As scientists place the human
genome in the public domain, it starts the clock for 102, which bars anyone from obtaining
a patent a year after is publication. For many sequences, this one-year bar has passed
already. The problem arises...because the 1999 Utility Requirements prevent patenting of
DNA where the function of the sequence is unknown. If a scientist ﬁnds a real world, speciﬁc
use, such as curing disease, and if this discovery occurs more than one year from the time
the information entered the public domain, the scientists may not obtain a patent.154
Essentially, if scientists do not discover a real world use for the sequence and ﬁle a claim within one year
153Mary Breen Smith, Comment, An End to Gene Patents? The Human Genome Project Versus the United States Patent and Trademark Oﬃce’s 1999 Utility Guidelines,
73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 747, 770 (2002).
47from the time it was ﬁrst deposited into a public database like GenBank, then they are barred from later
receiving a composition type claim.
However, those later scientists would still be able to receive “method of use” claims, often referred to as an
“improvement patents.” An inventor of a DNA sequence invention would prefer a composition claim to a
method of use claim for a number of reasons. First, composition claims give the broadest rights. Once an
inventor receives a composition type claim to a DNA sequence, she may exclude all uses of that sequence for
the duration of the patent term (even uses that are unknown at the time but will be created later). Method
of use claims, on the other hand, grant more limited rights. Although the patentee is able to exclude others
from using his new improvement, he might not even be able to practice the invention himself without getting
a license from the holder of the composition claim. Second, because composition claims give the patentee
the right to exclude anyone else from “making, using, or selling” the DNA sequence, the patentee may sue
another manufacturer for literal infringement. In contrast, holders of method claims may ﬁnd them harder
to enforce:
Infringers of a method claim are those who use the product, not the manufacturer of the
product. For example, the manufacturer of the protein does not infringe the method patent.
Rather, the end-user, such as the doctor prescribing its use to cure cancer, infringes. Plain-
tiﬀs ﬁnd it much more diﬃcult to sue many end-users than to sue one manufacturer.155
Because composition of matter claims are so preferable, there is worry that their unavailability will chill
ﬁrms’ willingness “to invest the huge sums necessary to bring these types of therapeutics to market.”156
C. Two Possible Responses to Strike a Better Balance
156Id. at 778.
48Thus far in this paper, we have seen the battle between upstream versus downstream patent rights played
out in a number of diﬀerent ways. We’ve seen how the entrance of the market into academia has inﬂuenced
the culture of science and served as the starting gun for one of the biggest races in the history of science –
the sequencing of the human genome. We’ve seen how legal commentators like Heller and Eisenberg feel that
upstream patents could result in a patent thicket logjam, whereas industrialists like Randall Scott of Incyte
believe that early patent protection is absolutely critical for capital formation and eﬃcient development of
downstream products. Finally, we’ve seen how an administrative agency, the PTO, has swayed back and
forth in its regulations on the patentability of DNA sequence inventions.
In tracking the history of the PTO’s utility requirements for genetic inventions, it’s easy to see the battle
between those in favor of the Bayh-Dole rationale and those against it. For example, from 1995 to 1999,
when private ﬁrms were forming and ESTs were being churned out at an unprecedented rate, the PTO
embraced the implicit notion that using an EST as a probe was a real world use. Although this seems
undoubtedly true (as evidenced by the fact that Celera, Incyte, and Human Genome Sciences were making
millions by providing access to these sequences), the PTO continued to wrestle with the question of whether
these companies were worthy of receiving the broad set of rights that would accompany composition of
matter claims on these DNA sequences. On one side of the coin (the side of the Bayh-Dole proponents),
these patents would assure the ﬁnancing necessary to fully explore the functions of the sequences and to
develop useful downstream products. Yet, on the other side (the side of the “tragedy of the anticommons”
and competition proponents), allowing these companies to exclusively control the future development of the
human genetic code might not be in the best interests of society.
In 1999, the PTO (ﬂooded with applications) reversed its course and, in instituting the new Utility Guidelines,
49seemed to embrace many of the concerns of the leaders of the HGP and commentators like Heller and
Eisenberg. In other words, since no patents on ESTs alone would issue under the new guidelines, researchers
could feel free to experiment without fear of infringement liability. However, in my opinion, the current law
still does not provide the optimum incentives since after only a year the utility and novelty requirements
together prevent that a composition claim can ever issue on the DNA sequence. Strong patent protection
(at some point) is simply too important for the eventual creation of health care products to risk switching
all patents in this ﬁeld to the weaker method of use type.
I believe that a combination of legal maneuvers could address the concerns of both sides of this argument, i.e.
could move the two warring tribes of the race for the human genome that much closer to peace. The ﬁrst step
would be to have Congress “adopt a speciﬁc exception for DNA sequences from the HGP from the operation of
[§] 102 of the Patent Act.”157SuchanexceptionwouldremovetheoneyearlimitationandallowthePTOtoissuecompositiontypepatentclaimsif
and when inventors discovered speciﬁc and substantial utilities for the claimed sequences. In terms of the
policy rationales:
Because DNA released by the HGP would remain generally non-patentable, scientists could
work without fear of interfering with any patents, thus encouraging basic research. Yet,
granting patents to such DNA when and if a commercial use is discovered would reward the
inventor who discovers a new way to treat disease. This result is consistent with the United
States patent system policy of demanding innovation from inventors before rewarding them
with a government-sponsored monopoly. Because much hard work and innovation is still
required to ﬁnd new disease treatments even with knowledge of the human genome sequence,
the proposed exception to [§] 102 would advance the purpose of the United States patent
laws.158
Keeping the stricter utility standards but adding the exception to § 102 prevents the gold rush mentality
while at the same time reinstitutes the Bayh-Dole rationale for patent protection.
157Smith, supra, at 782-83.
50However, some within the scientiﬁc community (e.g. James Watson) would say that this is not enough. A
second maneuver that might satisfy both “old school” scientists and proﬁt-driven corporations alike would
be expansion and codiﬁcation of the judicially-created experimental use defense to patent infringement.
Brieﬂy, besides denying that his conduct falls outside of the scope of the plaintiﬀ’s patent or challeng-
ing the validity of it, a defendant may also claim a number of aﬃrmative defenses. The experimental use
defense, which permits use of a patented invention for “philosophical experiment,” is one such aﬃrmative de-
fense.159However,astheFederalCircuithasrecentlyexplainedinthecaseof Madey v. Duke University, the experimental
use defense is extremely narrow.160
In Madey, the plaintiﬀ, a former professor of Duke University, owned a number of patents on certain laser
technology. After the relationship between Madey and Duke soured, Duke continued to use the patented tech-
nology, and Madey sued for infringement. The district court granted Duke’s motion for summary judgment,
reasoning that, under the experimental use exception, uses “solely for research, academic or experimental pur-
poses” did not infringe.161TheFederalCircuitreversedonthegroundsthatDuke
0suseofthepatentedtechnologywasinfurtheranceofits“legitimatebusinessobjectives
00−−whichincluded“educatingandenlighteningstudentsandfaculty”
and “increasing the status of the institution and luring lucrative research grants, students, and faculty.”162After
Madey, the experimental use defense is limited to actions performed “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity,
or for strictly philosophical inquiry.”163
159Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C. Mass. 1813).
160Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
161Id. at 1355.
162Id. at 1356, 1361-62.
163Id. at 1361 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
51Besides the extremely narrow experimental use defense, the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act provides a statutory
“safe harbor” which allows ﬁrms to use a patented pharmaceutical for regulatory compliance in preparation
for bringing a generic on the market after the patent term expires.164Thissafeharborallowsmanufacture,use,orsaleofapatentedinvention“solelyforusesreasonablyrelatedtothedevelopmentandsubmissionofinformationunderafederallawwhichregulatesthemanufacture,use,orsaleofdrugsorveterinarybiologicalproducts.
00165
In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, the Federal Circuit refused allow Merck to use proteins cov-
ered by Integra’s patent in preclinical research involving tumor angiogenesis.166TheCourtexplainedthatthesafeharbordidnot“reachbackdownthechainofexperimentationtoembracedevelopment.
00167Furthermore,itinterpretedthestatutorylanguage“reasonablyrelated
00tomeansolelyfor“thedevelopmentandsubmissionofinformationforFDA
0ssafetyandeffectivenessapprovalprocess.
00168
In dissent, Judge Newman argued that the experimental use exception should have immunized Merck’s
activity. She explained:
The purpose of a patent system is not only to provide a ﬁnancial incentive to create new
knowledge and bring it to public beneﬁt through new products; it also serves to add to
the body of published scientiﬁc/technologic knowledge. The requirement of disclosure of
the details of patented inventions facilitates further knowledge and understanding of what
was done by the patentee, and may lead to further technologic advance. The right to
conduct research to achieve such knowledge need not, and should not, await expiration of
the patent.169
In her opinion, to hold Merck and its academic collaborator liable for preclinical studies using the patented
16435 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
165Id.
166Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
167Id. at 865.
168Id. at 866.
52technology would stiﬂe early stage research and inhibit the discovery of new uses (which in turn could lead to
improvement patents). Judge Newman recognized that the common law exception can’t be unlimited as the
original incentive to innovate must remain primary.170Y et,referringtothe“fairuse
00doctrineincopyright,shebelievesthatthefactsofaparticularcasewill
allow “distinction between research and development.”171
I believe that a codiﬁed experimental use defense for preclinical research is something that Congress should
seriously examine. Although, as noted by Judge Newman, such a defense would involve a highly fact-speciﬁc
inquiry, I do not believe that this determination is any harder than the myriad of others that federal courts
must make during patent infringement lawsuits. The adoption of such a defense would alleviate many of
the concerns of patent thickets and provide upstream researchers with peace of mind (think James Watson
smiling). Furthermore, the defense would likely reduce the incentive to engage in defensive patenting – a tactic
that is ineﬃcient since its sole purpose is to prevent others from exploring uncharted waters. Finally, since
the defense would be limited to preclinical research, patents would still protect all inventions with commercial
value, and therefore would continue to bolster capital formation within the biotechnology industry.
In closing, I think these two possible changes in the law could help the two diﬀerent “camps” to see eye
to eye. Indeed, the goal of both groups is the same – they both want to see increased discovery in the
realm of human genetics and creation of life-saving health care products. They just seem to be focused
on diﬀerent ends of the development spectrum. The Bayh-Dole industrialists (if you will) are concerned
with obtaining the patents necessary to protect their signiﬁcant development costs. On the other hand, the
170See Integra, 331 F.3d at 876.
171Id.
53“put everything into the public domain” members of the scientiﬁc community are focused on maintaining
a healthy system of basic science research. These two changes in the patent law would move us closer to a
world where “everybody wins.” They would lead to better products while maintaining open research. The
human genome deserves such a result.
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